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COMMENTS
THE NEED FOR EDUCATION IN THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION
J. SKELLY WRIGHT*
"The best law enforcement has little value if prison sentences
are only temporary and embittering way stations for men whose
release means a return to crime."1
I
Criminal law, long the stepchild of the law school and the lawyer,
is showing signs of a return to acceptability. Once law school freshmen
dozed through this required course while freshmen law teachers, compelled
by their lack of seniority to teach it, droned through their notes. Now
bright-eyed young men and women, stimulated and directed by creative
and provocative lecturers, debate the concepts of culpability, capacity,
competence, equal justice, right to counsel, and the defendant's right to a
fair trial in relation to the rights of television and the press fully to
cover, not only the trial itself, but also the investigation which led to
the trial.
This resurgence of interest in the criminal law is also reflected
in the flood of law review articles discreetly telling the bench and bar
alike to wake up to new approaches to criminal justice.2 The annual ap-
plications for judicial clerkships confirm that criminal law is on the
way back. The superior students, the only ones who make applications
to be law clerks, seem to be deeply committed to the importance of
criminal law. The law schools are reaching out for these committed
young men with attractive teaching offers. Many of these men do go on
to teach criminal law. Thus this renewed interest in the criminal law is
transmitted from school to school.
One wonders what caused the change, what created all the interest.
I like to think that the idealism in these young people has been sparked
by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the area of the criminal
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. President Johnson's Crime Message to Congress, 112 CoNG. REc. 5147 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Hudon, Freedom of Press versus Fair Trials: The Remedy Lies with
the Courts, 1 Val. U.L. REv. 8 (1966); Kalven, American Jury and the Death
Penalty, 33 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 769 (1966); O'Brien, Implementing Justice: The
National Defender Project, 1 VAL. U.L. REv. 320 (1967) ; Tauro, Challenge to
American Criminal Jurisprudence, 50 JUDICATURE 188 (1967).
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law. For years we have professed equality before the law, proclaiming
that our Bill of Rights was equally applicable to all our citizens. But
those of us who are older in the law know full well that to the great
majority of defendants in criminal cases, the ones too poor to hire
competent counsel, these professions of equality were a cruel hoax.' The
kind of trial a defendant received did depend on the condition of his
pocketbook and the equality of our justice did depend, to some degree
at least, on who was receiving it.
The Supreme Court has sought to make good the constitutional
promise of equality to rich and poor alike by interpreting the Bill of
Rights as a code of law rather than as material for Fourth of July
speeches.4 This effort on the part of the Court has indeed stirred the law
schools to action. But we are only at the beginning of this revolution in
the criminal law. This revolution cannot succeed if the law acts in
isolation. As the great Roscoe Pound has said: Law is social engineering
-a means by which society attains its goals. Until society acts effectively
toward eliminating the causes of crimes-the discrimination in housing,
in schools, in jobs, a discrimination which creates the ghettos which
disgrace our urban centers-the law is merely spinning its wheels.'
II
As social engineers, lawyers and judges must learn and under-
stand, in addition to the causes of crime, the means by which the anti-
social person may be restored to useful citizenship. Again the law
cannot act in isolation. The rehabilitation of the criminal offender falls
primarily in the field of the behavioral scientist-the sociologist, the
anthropologist, the psychologist, the psychiatrist and the social worker.
Society, however, has chosen the law as its instrument to determine
not only the criminal responsibility-the guilt or innocence-of its
citizens, but the disposition of the guilty as well. The discipline of the
law, therefore, plays a crucial role in criminal correction. It is in the
field of criminal correction that the law schools in particular, and
3. For an American Bar Foundation survey of the national scope of the problem
of defending the poor, see L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE PooR-THE NATIONAL
REPORT (1965).
The most dramatic fact to emerge from this review of the past decade (1950-60)
is that there are now, at the end of it, nearly three times as many Legal Aid
and Defender offices in the United States as there were at the beginning. As
of June 1, 1960, there were 305 such offices in operation-a growth in ten years
from 92 to 209 Legal Aid offices and from 29 to 96 Defender offices.
E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES-SUPPLEMENT (1961).
4. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 352
U.S. 12 (1956).
5. R. POUND, PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW (1922).
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judges in general, have left something to be desired.'
No one today seriously denies that rehabilitation is the primary
goal of the correctional process. Yet all of us know that we have failed
to achieve that goal. Over half of the offenders entering federal and
state prisons today have been there before. Recidivism is the rule rather
than the exception. As long as this rule continues, the administration of
criminal justice shall have failed in its goals."
I am not suggesting, of course, that the law alone is responsible
for recidivism. The fault for the bankruptcy of our correctional system
must be laid at the door of society itself. It is society which provides
correctional institutions which often are nothing more than training
schools for criminals, where first offenders are converted into hardened
practitioners. Until society is educated to the need for rehabilitation and
provides for the implementation of that goal, not only as a moral
necessity but in its own self-interest, recidivism will continue to be the
rule rather than the exception.8
The education of society in this regard is, to some extent at least,
the responsibility of the law. To this end the law must look to the law
schools as the incubators of new ideas and approaches to social engineer-
ing in the field of rehabilitation. Courts, acting through sentencing judges
and using traditional criminal law concepts, have failed. Until sentencing
judges understand and apply social principles in the correction pro-
cess, recidivism will remain rampant.
III
The administration of criminal justice is directly responsible for
stigmatizing particular human beings as criminals. This stigma is one
of the primary causes of recidivism. Since this criminal stigma in
effect imprisons its wearer for the balance of his life, barring him from
participation in society as a truly free man, the law, in the light of
current social advance, should determine whether it is painting too
broadly with its criminal brush.
I am encouraged that, while our goal of human restoration is
6. See Rubin, Developments in Correctional Law, 12 CRIME AND DELINQ. 179
(1966); Saurez, Psychiatry and Criminal Law Education, in CRIME, LAW AND
CORRECTIONS (R. Slovenko ed. 1966) (wherein the role of psychiatry in the law is
analzyed and a suggestion made to the effect that the two fields be taught in the
undergraduate study of law.)
7. It has been estimated that over fifty percent of the felons that are discharged
from prison have further trouble with the law. It has further been suggested that
thirty-five percent of them are back in prison within three years of discharge. See D.
GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964); THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY-REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT 46 (1967).
8. See generally CRIME, LAW AND CORRECTIONS (R. Slovenko ed. 1966).
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still over the horizon, we in the law are taking some halting steps
toward its realization. The law is at least beginning to distinguish
between crime and disease. The criminal law from its historical beginning
has always treated alcoholism as a crime. We have known for years that
chronic alcoholism is a disease; yet we have continued to run
the sufferers from this unfortunate disease through the treadmill of the
criminal process-through the drunk tanks and the night courts-time
and again until in some cases the arrests for drunkenness run in the
hundreds. Imagine if you can what a drain on society's resources simply
arresting drunks is. Hundreds of thousands of drunk arrests are made in
this country each year.' Police officers' time, better used on the streets in
preventing crime, is wasted in following the course of a drunk arrest
through the courts. Our magistrates courts have become objects of
ridicule partly, at least, because they are required time and again
to deal with alcoholics on a criminal basis.
As a result of two recent cases there is hope that the criminal law
can wash its hands of the dirty business of treating sick people as
criminals. In a Fourth Circuit case the appellant, Driver, had been
arrested more than 200 times for public drunkenness."0 Holding that
chronic alcoholism is an illness, not a crime, the court stated:
The upshot of our decision is that the State (North Caro-
lina) cannot stamp an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a crimi-
nal if his drunken public display is involuntary as the result of
his disease. .... "
In Easter v. District of Columbia,12 we followed the lead of the Fourth
Circuit, reversing a conviction of public drunkenness on the ground
that the chronic alcoholic is a sick man, not a criminal. I predict that it
is only a question of time before all of the courts in this country, state and
federal, will recognize chronic alcoholism as a disease and proscribe
it as a basis for a criminal charge.
IV
Our court dockets are also crowded with prosecutions against
drug addicts. (The charge, however, is usually in terms of possessing,
buying or selling narcotics.) Unlike the chronic alcoholic, whose sentence
is usually stated in terms of days, the drug addict is subjected to savage
9. According to statistics cited in the comments to the Model Penal Code, of
2,612,704 arrests reported, 1,001,427 were for drunkenness. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
MODE. PENAL CODE § 250, Comment 1 (tent. draft no. 13).
10. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
11. Id. at 764.
12. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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mandatory minimum sentences running from five to ten years, without
benefit of probation or parole.1" The criminal law is the instrument used
by society to impose these sentences. Until now the courts, with their
hands tied by the mandatory minimum requirement of the sentencing
laws, have dutifully performed their function.
In this area too there is a glimmer of hope. The Supreme Court, in
Robinson v. California,4 has held that drug addiction is an illness
and that a drug addict cannot be branded as a criminal and punished
because he is ill. In Robinson the Supreme Court compared drug
addiction with any other disease and stated:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be
mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal dis-
ease. . . . in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a
law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments."
Following Robinson, President Kennedy appointed an Advisory
Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, which reported what every
informed person already knew-that drug addiction was indeed an
illness, and that it was a prostitution of the criminal process to use it
against sick people because of their sickness. But the public, long
suffering from an hysterical fear of "dope fiends," 6 had to be educated
so that Congress might act. The Commission made various recom-
mendations to the President, which President Johnson put in the form
of proposed legislation. After being watered down, these recommenda-
tions became the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966." Under
this Act, a person arrested for possession of narcotics need not be
prosecuted under the federal narcotics laws, provided he agrees to civil
commitment to a hospital which would treat his addiction. Even where
13. For a compilation of the various statutory penalties see W. ELDRIDGE,
NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 149-93 (1961).
14. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
15. Id. at 666.
16. For an examination of the basis of the fear of the "dope fiend," see Eldridge
supra note 13, at 12:
The critical view of addicts and addiction grew out of a great many misconcep-
tions. These misconceptions have been kept viable by a succession of inaccurate
information, sometimes innocent and sometimes artful, which has in time created
a whole body of dope mythology effectively blocking public support for a dis-
passionate inquiry. The social questions are not so clearly defined as many
would have us believe.
17. Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (1966).
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the arrest is for selling narcotics, if it appears that the sale was primarily
for the purpose of supporting his addiction, the defendant can be given
the alternative of civil commitment rather than sentence under the federal
narcotics laws.18 Thus, under the Act, drug addiction, even though it
manifests itself in the sale of drugs, may be treated for what it is-an
illness, not a crime.
V
Society, educated and led by the law and related disciplines, should
also strive to avoid stigmatizing its citizens as criminals even where
their antisocial acts are not the result of disease. Correction, which really
is the return to useful citizenship, is often thwarted rather than aided
by formal prosecution. This is true even where the prosecution ends in
probation. The criminal record, without more, causes the rejection and
the ostracism which denies employment and social acceptability. The
recidivism in many probation cases is directly attributable to the effect
of the criminal stigma.
We should go to great lengths, therefore, to avoid this stigma
in cases where there is a possibility of rehabilitation without it. One
obvious, though largely unused, method of avoiding the criminal stigma
and accomplishing rehabilitation is the deferment of prosecution con-
tingent on voluntary submission to correction authorities for such super-
vision, psychiatric support and employment aid as may be available.
The correction agencies of the state and federal governments, un-
fortunately, are presently not equipped to provide their services during
such a period of deferred prosecution. Without this kind of service the
danger of recidivism is increased, even with the best prospects for
rehabilitation.
Of course, many police and prosecuting authorities throughout the
country already exercise a kind of dispensing power. Where, in their
judgment, an individual who has committed an offense need not be
punished for it because the possibility of repetition is remote, or for other
reasons, no prosecution is instituted. Inherent in the exercise of this
informal dispensing power, however, is the danger of unequal justice
resulting from improper pressure on the dispensing authorities, or
genuine mistake in failing to recognize the need for rehabilitative help.
I suggest that in some cases there should indeed be a dispensing authority.
That authority should be the judge aided by the recommendations of
the prosecutor, the representations of defense counsel and an in-depth
18. The Act allows commitment for treatment only if the person engaged in the
sale did so for the "primary purpose of obtaining a drug which he requires for his
personal use because of his addiction to such drug." 18 U.S.C. § 4251 (f) (2) (1966).
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report from the probation authorities. So informed, a judge may decide
with some assurance that formal prosecution is unnecessary, provided
there is voluntary acceptance of aid in rehabilitation.
Our present penal institutions are geared primarily to custodial
care. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 196519 does provide, however,
for the establishment of residential community treatment centers, popu-
larly known as "half-way houses." These community treatment centers
are staffed with psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, employment
personnel, and representatives of other disciplines concerned with re-
habilitation. The centers are small and community-oriented, primarily
serving as a bridge back to life in the community for those offenders
terminating their sentences.
The community treatment centers could be used as well for the in-
patient or out-patient care of persons whose prosecution has been in-
formally deferred. With the help of personnel from these centers, such
persons can be physically, educationally and psychiatrically prepared to
accept employment in the community where they live. Further, their
development can be followed in that employment and in their day-to-day
lives until rehabilitation is effected. In this way employment and social
acceptability can more easily be found for such offenders not stig-
matized as criminals.
The deferment of prosecution, of course, does not preclude pro-
secution if the informal attempt at rehabilitation fails. But unless a real
effort is made to rehabilitate the offender without prosecution, the
possibility of recidivism in every case is apparent.
The New York Times2" recently carried a story, the first line of
which read: "A program to get jobs or job training for selected de-
fendants in criminal cases instead of prosecuting them was announced
jointly yesterday by Mayor Lindsay and Senator Robert F. Kennedy."
The announcement of these political leaders, sensitive to the problem
of the urban slum and the crime which the hopelessness and rejection
of the slum creates, stated that the program was to be used "to bring
stability to the lives of many who may have turned to crime because of
inadequate education and job opportunities." A three-year test of the
plan is to be carried out with federal funds in Manhattan Criminal
Court. The famed Vera Institute of Justice will screen the offenders for
19. Prisoner Rehabilitation Act of 1965, 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1966). This Act gives
the Attorney General three important powers. He may commit or transfer prisoners to
the community treatment center. Also, the Attorney General may allow a prisoner to
work in private employment while he remains an inmate. Finally, in emergency
situations or as part of the preparation for release, the Attorney General may grant
brief periods of leave.
20. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1967, p. 19, col. 1.
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whom the program will be made available. The plan provides for release
without bail accompanied by job training and employment. A report on
the offender's possibilities would be made available to the judge, and the
judge would decide whether prosecution should be deferred pending the
informal rehabilitative attempt.
VI
Where deferment of prosecution is not possible, or where an at-
tempt at deferment fails, and the offender eventually pleads guilty or is
convicted, the judge will be called upon to pronounce sentence. On
another occasion I have suggested, and I suggest again, that judges are
not qualified by training to impose sentence. Expert consideration of what
length of time is required to rehabilitate a particular defendant falls in
the ken of disciplines other than the law; moreover, that consideration
should be a continuing one related to the progress of the subject. Thus,
in addition to lacking the necessary sociological training, the judge is
called upon to impose a sentence before the subject's initial response to
rehabilitative attempts is available. It is for this reason that I have long
felt that something akin to the California system2 is much preferable
to the sentencing procedures now generally in use in state and federal
courts. In sentencing, a judge should merely determine whether or not
the subject is to be placed on probation. If that determination goes
against the subject, then the subject should be committed to the cor-
rectional authorities, to be released at any time within the maximum
period provided by law. While it is true that deterrence is still a factor
to be considered in sentencing, particularly in some kinds of offenses,
the fact of commitment itself, possibly for the maximum period permitted
by law, should be deterrent enough.
VII
In addition to suggesting that the judge be shorn of much of the
responsibility of sentencing, I have a suggestion relating to the re-
sponsibility for ending the sentence. This suggestion concerns the parole
boards. I think that the state and federal governments should give con-
sideration to abolishing parole boards. Parole boards are usually politi-
cally appointed and the members thereof are often long on political
influence and short on education in the behavioral sciences. The result
has been a series of scandals in relation to the obtaining of paroles for
clients of lawyers presumably favored by parole boards. A professional
21. For a description of the California system see Fenton, Group Counseling:
A Method for the Treatment of Prisoners, in CRIME, LAW AND CORRECTIONs 606
(R. Slovenko ed. 1967).
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correction agency which has followed the subject through service of his
sentence is in a much better position fairly to determine the time of his
parole. The correction agency would transfer selected subjects, when
deemed ready, to residential community treatment centers and obtain jobs
for them in the community while they live at the community center. The
information obtained through these functions would enable the agency
to know when the next stop in phasing out the subject's obligation
under his sentence can be taken.
VIII
I have one further thought in connection with correctional procedure.
It is with reference to the efficacy of the adversary system itself in the
field of criminal justice. I have come to believe that with respect to
many offenders, particularly those from our urban slums, the adversary
system has not worked well. We all know and accept society's responsi-
bility for slum-produced crime. We know, too, that the deprivation and
discrimination of the slums is not the choice of the slum dweller. But
their effect on him as a potentially antisocial person, often without
fault of his own, is unmistakable. Thus, in my judgment, society has
a great responsibility to the slum dweller who finds himself enmeshed
in the toils of the law.
It is true that we are now providing counsel for the indigent in most
cases." It is true also that, largely because of the work of the Vera
Foundation, our approach toward bail has become more realistic and
humane.23 These two advances have intensified the adversary character
of the criminal law as it relates to the poor. Instead of pleading guilty in
80, sometimes even 90, percent of the cases, the rate of guilty pleas in the
District of Columbia, for example, has declined to 40 percent in the last
two years. In spite of this decline the rate of convictions has remained
more or less constant.
In many cases, taking the indigent defendant to trial has encouraged
false hopes, led to a rationalization of innocence, and has frequently
produced perjured defenses. Thus, when sentencing time eventually
comes, the sentence is often not only longer but is imposed on a defendant
who often feels he has been done a great injustice. The defendant's dis-
satisfaction with the treatment he received in court and his dissatisfaction
with society in general is reflected in his reaction to rehabilitative at-
22. For a discussion of the systems that presently provide this representation see
O'Brien, Implementing Justice: The National Defender Project, 1 VAL. U.L. REV.
320 (1967).
23. For a discussion of the effects of the Vera project on the bail system see
Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1498 (1966).
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tempts on the part of correction authorities. Ultimately this dissatis-
faction may contribute to his recidivism.
It seems to me that our criminal law, particularly with reference to
the poor offender, ought to be oriented toward treatment of that offender
at the earliest possible moment. This treatment should take place before
his suspicion and rejection of society is confirmed by the criminal process
itself. Early treatment can be facilitated by proper use of the public
defenders. If we are going to have public defenders for the poor, these
public defenders, who hopefully will be brought in to assist the accused
immediately on his arrest, should assert every legal defense available to
the defendant. But after it becomes clear that it would be futile to take
the case to trial, the public defender will best serve the defendant and
society by attempting to have the prosecution deferred for an informal
rehabilitative attempt, or otherwise terminated without delay and further
frustration. If the public defender is able to convince his client that the
client's interests can best be served by early disposition, the chance for
rehabilitation is improved immeasurably. It is my judgment that in many
cases involving the poor, particularly those from our urban slums, our
much heralded fair trial often results only in even greater rejection of
society by the offender.
In this I am reminded of an observation of the noted British
author, G. K. Chesterton, in commenting on the impersonal routine
to which an offender is subjected in the criminal courts:
And the horrible thing about all legal officials, even the
best, about all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and
policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of them are good),
not that they are stupid (some of them are quite intelligent) ;
it is simply that they have gotten used to it. They simply do
not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the usual man in
the usual place. They do not see the awful court of judgment;
they see only their own workshop.
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